Showing posts with label fair use. Show all posts
Showing posts with label fair use. Show all posts

Sunday, August 03, 2008

Oh, and theory

I was just reviewing a book I bought for Dr. Northcutt's class last summer (an overview of qualitative research methods) and it occurred to me as I prepared to review for the nth time all the various theories of social science, the philosophies of science and quantitative and qualitative methods, that maybe there's no magic theory that I have to latch onto to look into the question of the effectiveness of best practices over guidelines. Maybe it is a simple as my own intuition (my own theory?) that people have an intuitive sense of right and wrong, and an intuitive sense of what will work in their day-to-day lives, and they react positively to, are more receptive to, "norms" that don't offend their intuition. That's always been one of the most perplexing things about trying to explain copyright law to people: it confounds expectations, logic, and intuition. What a normal person expects or thinks the law must be is not what it is. It is horribly counter-intuitive. Maybe best practices are, well, they actually are, what people are doing, that is, what they believe is ok, so they are much more in line with intuition, not bent ("negotiated") to the bizarre fears of copyright maximalists.

So, theory would be that best practices, being documented practices of a representative sample of teachers or librarians or whatever, inspire confidence because they make sense at an intuitive level. This puts me squarely on the subjective/interpretive side of things. I am interested in how and what people perceive as fair, rejecting that there is some objective fairness out there to be discovered. It is subjective, what's fair. We won't all agree. But we can document what many teachers or librarians think, and put it out there for others to see, and they either will or won't feel validated in their own subjectively held beliefs about what's fair.

Feels too thin. Too easy. Too superficial. I need to talk to other grad students about this and what it is part of (I feel that it is part of a bigger picture, but I can't see the rest of it).

The search for the question

I got some good advice from a fellow grad student in response to my last post (thanks, Bettie). She noted that I had failed to state any research questions in there, and was stuck on method (which I did acknowledge in the post). Excellent points. I spent quite a bit of time trying to learn how to generate research questions during the last year of classes. I never quite got beyond the point where it seemed like an artificial process because I had always been starting from the point of wanting to explore some phenomenon very generally. My "real" research question was merely, "what's up with that?" And therein lies the reason that ethnography appeals to me so much: that's precisely what it's about -- what's up with that. But she convinced me that continuing to look at research questions as an afterthought is not going to work. Merely explaining some phenomenon is not going to work. I need to start with questions, not tack them on at the end.

So, I'm going to expand on idea number 3 from the last post: Ethnography of the process of creating Best Practices for Fair Use in Education (a Berkman Center project I just learned about).

Strip out the ethnography pre-condition and I have a phenomenon, the phenomenon of generating best practices. Now I'm going to have a little talk with Bettie (a pretend talk) about this idea.

Bettie asks, "what do you want to know about generating best practices?"
Me: Well, I want to know if they work.

Bettie: What does "work" mean?
Me: Work means that they change perceptions or they change behaviors, or both.

Bettie: Whose perceptions and behaviors?
Me: For starters, the people they are created for, in the case of Harvard's Berkman Center fair use project, teachers. But second, I wonder if they change perceptions and behaviors of people who have traditionally wanted to limit or even marginalize educational fair uses, the copyright owner community. In the Center for Social Media's first set of best practices, the documentary filmmakers were on both sides of the debate, both users and owners of copyrights, so there was less a sense of imbalance, of power versus powerlessness. In educational environments, teachers, rightly I think, tend to view themselves as vulnerable and powerless in the face of possible allegations of infringement and the resulting liability that can ruin their lives.

Bettie: There are a lot of questions in there. List them out.
Me: Do teachers feel more comfortable relying on fair use after they learn about normative best practices documented by prestigious research institutions? Do teachers actually rely on fair use more after they learn about normative best practices blah, blah, blah? Do copyright owners accept and express support for statements of best practices to which they did not contribute? Ultimately, the question is, does the best practices process increase reasonable reliance on fair use when compared to guidelines?

Bettie: What are guidelines?
Me: Well, they are statements about the scope of fair use that are "negotiated" between the content owners and educators, and as such, they tend to be skewed towards the interests of the more powerful of the negotiators and thus, quite narrow in their interpretations of what is acceptable. While colleagues might disagree about how narrow and whether or to what extent they are useful, it seems that it would be possible to determine to what extent they are used and relied upon, and compare that to the extent of use and reliance on a similar best practices document that did not involve the "negotiation" among grossly unequal bargainers, by not including input from the copyright owner community at all. That seems to be the core question.

Bettie: OK. You have a question now. How would you go about answering it?
Me: EEK. It seems to require some big-time surveys of lots and lots of teachers regarding their comfort levels with relying on fair use in their teaching, whether they know about and if they do, how they use existing guidelines, and then some surveys of teachers after the best practices are published, to see if attitudes change. I wonder if it would have to be the same teachers, a longitudinal study? And the Berkman Center estimates its project will take 3-4 years. EEK again. I don't think this is doable.

Bettie: Try another question.
Me: But that's what I want to know about. Are they effective? Why put a lot of energy and time into a process that is going to be, in the end, a waste of time? Again, folks can disagree with me about this, but I would *never* become involved in a guidelines negotiation again because I think they are a huge waste of time. The whole concept of the "negotiation" is flawed. And yet, this is a common practice, not just in this context, but in life in general. We reach compromise.

But if the guidelines compromises have been on the whole not very useful (and I could find out how useful or not useful they have been), why do we think that best practices will be any better when we are leaving one side out of the discussion? What is it about this process that we think will satisfy and calm the excluded interest? Or is it that we are just giving up on caring about what they think?

I know how I reacted to the statement on a group of STM publishers' websites of what they considered best practices for researching orphan works status, which clearly did not involve any normal people (non-publishers). I thought the effort was designed for other publishers and of no relevance for regular people at all. You'd have to have a commercial motive in planning to use the orphan work, and the money to back up your plans with very expensive research to satisfy their best practice document. Sort of like the slant of the most recent orphan works bills. But I digress. But only a little.

I guess I really want to know if this is different and if it will be a more productive use of time, money and energy. Ultimately, if it is effective and productive, I would like to see best practice documents for librarians about how to select analog materials for digitizing, online materials for archiving, etc., taking the copyright caselaw and statutes into account, but relying more on actual best practices, and without undertaking the largely futile attempt we saw in the Section 108 study group, to obtain buy-in for what publisher participants seemed to feel are monstrously threatening actions, that are in reality, very important and useful library functions of archiving and providing public access (I hear the screams -- access!!!!!! oh, my god no, not that...). In truth, I don't think a substantial number of publishers will be able to accept any risk to their current business models until more of them have managed to move beyond those models, and who knows when that will be. Thankfully there is progress here, including notable efforts by many scholarly publishers to experiment with new business models. But it is very slow-going, and while the majority of publishers is figuring out that easily accessible and freely usable digital copies are their friends, libraries still need to make decisions about what to save and who to let see what. Best practices might help. Might not. Wouldn't it be useful to know something about how they are created and how they are used? Or not?

Next time: uh, oh, what about theory? Am I just too practical? Is all I care about what works, efficiency, and getting results for effort? Damn. I'll never be an academic. Must... drag... self.... to... ivory... tower... Oh, who am I kidding?

Saturday, March 31, 2007

Of the case for fair use: digital distribution of course materials

I thank everyone who commented on my draft manuscript, On the Case for Fair Use. I incorporated changes that reflected comments I received and appreciate those who took the time to comment. Thanks! Georgia

Saturday, February 17, 2007

Apple - Pro - Profiles - Neal Ashby & Matthew Curry

I am just so fascinated by the fact that I can think of any question I want at any time I want and if I'm on (connected), I can just ask it. Damn. This is just so incredible. But even more incredible is that the answers as often as not connect things that seem totally unconnected at first glance.

I was reading my homework assignment for Survey of Digitization (honest) and listening to Mirror Conspiracy at the same time (I didn't used to be able to do that but my coffee house experiences have made a big difference in my ability to love more than one input at a time) and suddenly I had this question about when Thievery Corporation might be coming to Austin again and I Googled it and ended up, through a few clicks, finding a site that I must refer my Survey of Digitization prof to: Apple - Pro - Profiles - Neal Ashby & Matthew Curry. She is into the art of album covers and wonders about what's happening to all that information that used to be a part of an album experience. And so is Thievery Corporation and its artistic designers for its most recent album, Versions (who just picked up a Grammy for this one).

So Thievery Corporation loops back around to my Survey of Digitization class, but that's not the only connection. The article about the album cover for Versions just happens, at its end, to talk about the future of the digital album cover. So there it is again, my interest in the future of the book running through everything I think about and do. One big circle of connection and relationship and integration. And I actually have the time to think about all this and write about it and maybe get a Ph.D. in the process... Wow. Please do not wake me up. This is such a neat dream!

Eek! I have to go pick up my mom and take her shopping.

Wednesday, February 07, 2007

Pam Sameulson's, Can Copyright Survive the Web by Lightening Up a Little?

Pam Samuelson's recent talk on her 5 year project to rewrite the copyright act is online: Can Copyright Survive the Web by Lightening Up a Little?. What a fabulous project. It will be very interesting to see how it develops and what effect it has.

Monday, February 05, 2007

Turning point in copyright infringement cases | Stanford Center for Internet and Society [beta site]

In a very poignant post, Turning point in copyright infringement cases, author Balazs Bodo at Stanford's Center for Internet and Society lays out what he terms a "lose-lose" choice for Bill Gates. He's got a high profile request to intervene in a prosecution of a teacher in Russia for copyright infringement -- use of MS software without a license.

Interestingly, beyond Bado's commentary, two of the four arguments being made on behalf of the Russian teacher are arguments I outlined in one section of the paper I blogged here over the fall semester, On the Case for Fair Use, about the viability of a fair use claim for electronic reserves and digital distribution through courseware platforms like BlackBaord. A third argument has been floating around for awhile, the idea that remedies are out of proportion to the harm to the copyright owner.

I referred to the argument generally as a dysfuntional market argument, but in the paper, I concluded that in an American court today, the argument that educators shouldn't have to pay (ie their uses of others works in large-scale digital distributions to students should be fair use) if they can't afford it, isn't likely to be a winner. To read more than just the one section of the article referenced above, pull up the posts labeled copyright and that should retrieve them all (and a few other things no doubt).

I wonder whether, if such a claim succeeds in any forum, it is more likely to succeed in other fora. There would, in any event, still be considerable problems with it, as I suggest in the article. An interesting choice for Mr. Gates.

Wednesday, January 24, 2007

Of the case for fair use: digital distribution of course materials: Conclusion

Conclusion

Back to Basics: The Underlying Assumptions Redux

It must be apparent from the range of approaches available to the courts, the range of fair use outcomes in the strictly iterative (non-transformational) cases, the closely divided nature of the decisions, the frequent and lengthy dissents, and the way courts tend to be reversed at successive stages of litigation, that fair use functions as a sort of Rorschach test, its outcome reflecting neatly the court’s underlying beliefs about how copyright law should be. Any given use can be characterized by a set of facts, and the court can emphasize among the many facts those that best support its underlying beliefs about whether a particular use should be fair.

This means, for example, that it is of little utility to argue among ourselves whether electronic reserve use of an article is a “transformative” use. It can be, if the court wants the use to be fair. It won’t be, if he court does not want the use to be fair. The task is not to convince the court that a use is transformative, it is to convince the court that it wants the use to be fair.

More generally, it is simply not enough to advocate a specific approach to the four factor analysis – one must first convince the court that a use should be fair, that the public needs to be able to freely make the particular use, or more broadly, freely benefit from the use, and that the social benefit of the use should prevail over the copyright owner’s need to control the use and derive revenue from it. In short, the court must affirmatively believe that enhancing public benefit and use is better than preserving actual or potential copyright owner revenues and control. If a court is so persuaded, the four factors will be made to follow. So persuading the court of the fundamental need for fair use in this context is the task for anyone among us who champions a blanket educational use exemption (the strict logic approach) or a finely nuanced financial hardship educational use exemption (the market dysfunction approach).

Thus, we can urge the use of a different framework from the one used by courts today to evaluate these types of uses, in order to expand fair use in educational contexts. We can explicitly ask courts to emphasize the public interest in our uses and to weigh that benefit against the harm to established markets. But unless we first convince the courts to turn the assumption that underlies the property theory of copyright generally, and market failure theory in particular, on its head -- that is, instead of assuming the owner is entitled to everything he can get, assume students and educators are entitled to freely use others’ works and that owners’ rights do not need any more protection than necessary to fund creation -- we would seem unlikely to prevail.

Is this an argument we are prepared to make? We might consider the consequences if we won: Asserting that all educators and students, or even a financially strapped subset of them, should be able freely to copy and distribute others’ works electronically could seriously undermine the financial support our own scholarly presses derive from permission fees, to say nothing of the financial support the broader community of publishers receives from educators who are in many cases their primary market.[1]

One might also ask as a practical matter, should we defend as fair use by enacting as policy that which we are unlikely to be able to defend in the courtroom? The Sony precedent and the good-faith fair use defense[2] may give universities enough comfort to take the risk, but will the evolution of publishing business models soon obviate the need for reliance on fair use in the Electronic Distribution context anyway?[3] More and more, licensing allows us to comprehensively acquire the rights to use others’ works that we know our faculty and students need. To the extent that licensing fails to meet educators’ needs as it clearly fails for books (few if any are available as aggregated licensed works), should universities instead insist that those who publish books, especially those intended for academic use, make them available in the form of licensed databases of aggregated content, as journal articles are made available today?

Several scholars note that iterative fair uses are important for other reasons besides merely multiplying and distributing copies. Where access to works is impaired by high prices (market dysfunction), many core fair uses (criticism, commentary, and other transformative uses) that might have been made will not be made.[4] Thus, the argument has been made that First Amendment concerns permeate even iterative copying, and that fair use should take account of that fact in the iterative context. But to the extent that this argument can be characterized as a specific example of a dysfunctional market, that is, the price for access is too high, therefore financially strapped users will not gain access, the argument will be vigorously challenged in any court adhering to market failure principles. Ultimately then, although iterative copying may indirectly support First Amendment values, arguments in favor of characterizing it as a fair use on First Amendment grounds will still have to succeed before a court likely to focus only on the iterative event, not the speculative later end result of a possible second transformative, perhaps critical, use.

Distinguishing Core Fair Uses from Iterative Uses

We are now back to where we started: will reduction in the scope of iterative fair use affect the case for core, creative, transformative fair use -- fair use for commentary, criticism, news reporting, parody, artistic expression, scholarship and research? Can core fair uses survive the property premise, that copyright owners are entitled to every cent they can get, with fair use an onerous tax on their revenues? Can they survive if courts forget that a monopoly is not a good thing and that the monopoly, rather than fair use, should be limited to the extent it is needed to achieve a socially beneficial goal that can not be achieved through less drastic means?

Of course, the ultimate fear is that fair uses of every type can be eliminated once it is clearly established that copyright owners are entitled to control any use they are able to charge for. By the mere expedient of raising a price above what a user is willing or able to pay, a copyright owner can discourage or prevent uses he does not like for whatever reason.[5] Who will be able to effectively question whether his reason is that he needs the money to further his creative efforts or that he dislikes the expression contained in a derivative work? Even if unintentional, the result will be the same: fewer, not more, works will be created. Wendy Gordon suggests that even under market failure analysis, uses refused for non-economic reasons should be permitted as fair, although she looks to tort law principles to narrowly draw the limits of the exception.[6] Perhaps it is necessary to look to bodies of law outside copyright to justify fair uses that fully comply with the fair use statute and clearly promote the progress of knowledge where courts have been persuaded to abandon those copyright principles in the first place, in favor of microeconomic analysis with its premise that copyright owners’ rights should be interpreted expansively. If those rights were interpreted as the monopoly they are, fair users might not be disproportionately burdened with the obligation to “justify and excuse” themselves.

Nevertheless, courts have shown more support for core fair uses and conversely, more resistance to the claims of copyright owners in this area.[7] For example, in Bill Graham Archives,[8] the court found that including seven small images of concert posters in a book detailing the phenomenon of the Grateful Dead was a transformative fair use even though the plaintiff copyright owner was willing to license the use and the alleged infringer had paid many other copyright owners for the use of other images included in the Grateful Dead book. The court distinguishes clearly between iterative and transformative uses in its fourth factor analysis. It flatly rejects the idea that one can control transformative uses by offering to charge for them. This holding is very encouraging, especially coming as it does from the Second Circuit, home to the publishing industry. Also encouraging, the Kelly and Field cases discussed supra at footnote xx found that even iterative copying was fair use where it was also transformative in nature and no harm to markets for the originals could be shown.[9] On the other hand, we have precedent in the Sixth Circuit in a case analyzing transformative uses of music (a three-second sample) that is directly at odds with the Second Circuit’s approach.[10]

Additionally, on some occasions when courts have acquiesced to copyright owners’ demands in the creative use context, Congress has stepped in to defend core fair uses such as historical commentary and criticism.[11] Recall also the considerable number of scholars cited at the outset of this article who vigorously defend the fundamental need to protect core fair uses. Unless scholars like Julie Cohen and Rebecca Tushnet are able to change the general perception that iterative copying does not need the protection of the law, the mere possibility of collateral damage to transformative uses is not likely to dissuade courts from concluding that iterative uses are not fair.

The Task for the Educational Community

That copyright owners can defeat particular iterative fair use claims by licensing the use appears to firmly hold sway over courts today. Thus, where markets are reasonably able, even if imperfectly able, to meet educators’ needs for authorized copies of articles and book chapters for their students’ use, courts are unlikely to step in, interfere in the functioning of those markets, and declare unauthorized uses to be fair.[12] I conclude in the face of this trend that universities will find it difficult to prevail on a claim that Electronic Distribution of easily licensable materials is fair use in all cases. Perhaps one may still effectively argue that some such iterative uses are fair, such as those involving occasional use, actual spontaneous use, or more broadly, a first time use, but near-instant permission processes and the real possibility of blanket licenses covering such uses available through the CCC would seem to undermine that argument as well.

On the other hand, it appears that clearly transformative uses cross a dividing line between unfair and fair. With respect to some media at least, there continues to be good precedent indicating that copyright owners cannot control creative uses of modest scope by refusing to permit them, or even by offering to charge for them.[13] Certainly where it is not practically feasible to charge for them, where the market for such uses simply does not and probably cannot exist, fair use prevails even for iterative uses.[14]

If this assessment is accurate, fair use still may safeguard core uses, but if the evolution of copyright law through the twentieth century has taught us anything, it is that fair use in any form will survive only if it has very strong, informed and active advocates. The publishing and entertainment industries can certainly be characterized as having on more than one occasion evidenced a myopic view of their own best interests.[15] But their view will prevail, whether ultimately good for them or not, unless it is countered forcefully and effectively.



[1] Textbooks obviously come to mind, but even major journal publishers may count educational markets among their most important.

[2] 17 U.S.C. 504(c)(2)(i). This defense requires the court to remit damages in any case in which the nonprofit educational or library defendant or its employee proves that it reasonably believed that its actions constituted fair use.

[3] Further, publishers’ employment of digital rights management may further moot this whole discussion insofar as it enables unilateral determination of the rights that users enjoy. Fair use is not likely to be among those rights, or if it is, it may only be a rough, algorithmic, no doubt conservative approximation.

[4] For example, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, Rebecca Tushnet 114 Yale L. J. 535; The Place of the User in Copyright Law, Julie E. Cohen 74 Fordham L. Rev. 347 (2005).

[5] The recent declaratory judgment action involving the treatment by James Joyce’s estate of scholars’ requests to use materials in research on the author is illustrative. [cite.]

[6] Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Commodification and Market Perspectives, The Commodification of Information: Social, Political, and Cultural Ramifications, Klewer International 2002; criticized in Lunney’s Fair Use and Market Failure.

[7] Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.; Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006); Sun Trust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.; New Era Publications Int’l v. Carol Publishing Group, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990); Nuñez v. Caribbean International News Corp. (El Vocero de Puerto Rico), 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000); cf. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).

[8] Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).

[9] Kelly v. Arriba Soft; Field v. Google. These were also, however, cases where requiring the defendants to take a license, that is, ruling that their uses were not fair, would have been impractical as there is no way such a license could be implemented in the framework of Internet search engine functioning. There was, in other words, a massive market failure *and* a transformative use. Digital Distribution can not easily claim either. Both of these cases appear to confirm the hypothesis that if a court wants to find a use fair, it will, and the four factors can be made to follow.

[10] Bridgeport (criticized). It may be that courts may justifiably take different approaches to this issue depending on the sector of the content industry involved (suggested by Bill McGevern in discussions May, 2006). The sector-specific “best practices” that seem to be developing in response to over-aggressive permissioning of every inclusion, no matter how small, would support the view that there are different standards from sector to sector. Documentary film makers are taking concrete steps towards stronger recognition of fair use rights (cite to Best Practices) while the music industry does not appear to even contemplate such moves.

[11] New Era Publications Int’l ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d. Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987); followed in 1992 by an amendment to 17 U.S.C. 107 to clarify that the unpublished nature of a copyrighted work does not bar a finding of fair use.

[12] This “stepping in and interfering” in the market is precisely what we must urge that courts do if we are to argue that all or some part of Electronic Distribution is fair use.

[13] Suntrust; Bill Graham Archive.

[14] Kelly v. Arriba Soft; Field v. Google; Perfect 10 v. Google (RAM copy).

[15] L. Ray Patterson, What’s Wrong with Eldred? An Essay on Copyright Jurisprudence, 10 J. Intell. Prop. L. 345.

Wednesday, January 17, 2007

Gadgets as tyrants -- or is it content owners as tyrants?

Today in the NYT, there's an article about the Las Vegas consumer electronics show in which the author complains about drm limiting freedom to use media on devices as the consumer wishes. Of course, this is interesting to me and to many people I know, including Peg O'Donnell, who created and updates the legal office's Web site for Catholic University in D.C. So she's posting a link to the article on the Web site. Straightforward enough, but the cool thing is that 3 months ago I wouldn't have had a clue about how to do this, that it was even do-able, and I certainly wouldn't have been able to show anyone else how to do it, and most of all, blog about it. Not that it's earth-shattering. But it's just so wonderful to have the time and the inclination, and the structure of a course of study that really requires that I engage technologies, information, and learn in these ways. It's at times daunting. Sometimes I am a bit overwhelmed. But it's just intrinsically exciting.

Monday, January 08, 2007

Of the case for fair use: digital distribution of course materials: summary of approaches to fair use

Summary of Approaches to Fair Use Analysis

We have discussed five approaches to fair use analysis. It is my conclusion that even the most lenient approach will offer little support for fair use Electronic Distribution in today's courtrooms.

1. Strict logical construction: in this case the court would accept as fair use those uses where the first three factors favored fair use in the nonprofit educational context, ignoring all evidence of harm to markets as logically irrelevant insofar as it represents payments that are not due if a use is fair, and so cannot be presumed “lost” because of the use unless it is otherwise determined to be unfair. Williams & Wilkins illustrates this approach.

2. Creative destruction: in this case the court would accept as fair use those uses where the consumers of copyrighted works are funding the making and distribution of the copies in question, and creation of the works in question does not depend on sales of copies.

3. Sony traditional revenues only: in this case, the court would accept as fair use only those uses that provide a clear social benefit, and when weighing the social benefit against the harms to the copyright owner, the court would limit the relevant market to current revenue streams.

4. Market dysfunction (broad interpretation of market failure): in this case the court would accept as fair use those uses that demonstrate market failure due to high transaction costs or market dysfunction due to inability to pay – inability to internalize social benefits or monetize a party’s interests; the relevant market would be both current and future revenue streams that might exist if the court finds for the copyright owners. No court has taken this approach.

5. Strict interpretation market failure: in this case, the court would accept as fair use only those uses that demonstrate near total and likely continuing failure of the market due to high transaction costs; the relevant market would be both current and future revenues that might exist if the court finds for the copyright owners. Texaco illustrates this approach where the use was not found to be fair; more recent cases involving Internet search engines (Kelly v. Arriba Soft & Google v. Field) illustrate this approach where the use was found to be fair.

Sony and creative destruction both offer fairly aggressive arguments for fair use. Creative destruction would even legitimize unauthorized peer-to-peer (p2p) music file sharing. In fact, that is exactly what Ku argues: that p2p file sharing has creatively destroyed the market for CD distribution because individuals make their own copies and pay for the distribution network themselves (computers, peripherals, ISP service).[1] Further, sales of copies are in fact notoriously not a source of income for most musicians.[2] One can also identify this phenomenon at work much earlier with respect to sheet music and the advent of photocopying. So, for example, a court using this analysis could find under the fourth factor that p2p file sharing of music does not harm the market for or value of copyrighted recordings.[3]

Ku assumed that courts were more likely to implement creative destruction than the legislature would be to reform copyright law by placing a limit embodying this theory on copyright owners’ exclusive rights. Recent cases involving p2p issues would cast considerable doubt on this likelihood, however, because all have assumed that direct copying by p2p software users is infringing, including the Supreme Court in the recent case of MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.[4]

Moreover, it seems unlikely that Electronic Distribution would qualify broadly as fair under creative destruction analysis. Creative destruction characterizes as fair those uses 1) where the user makes his own copies and pays for the distribution system, and 2) where revenues from the sale of copies is not required to fund the creation of the works the user copies. That description does not currently characterize all of the materials that educators must use in teaching. Scholarly articles arguably fit the description, though there would no doubt be argument to the contrary. Textbook and trade book publishers would vigorously refute the characterization.

Perhaps the market dysfunction argument, creatively and thoughtfully applied, is at least a possibility, but as indicated earlier, its advocates would have to define the subtle contours of a very challenging argument.

Finally, the circularity argument will likely fail, as indicated above, because it can so easily be gotten around by manipulating the first three factors to favor getting permission, thus eliminating the appearance of “… converting an otherwise fair use into an infringing one.”

If posting articles or book chapters for students to read over successive semesters would likely fail to qualify as fair use under every theory of fair use including the “strict logic” circularity approach to the fourth factor, how do we reasonably defend it? And what are the implications of such a likely failure for fair use policy? In general, how do we defend policies that describe a scope for fair use significantly beyond its likely interpretation in courts today?



[1] Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and creative destruction, 565 - 566.

[2] Ku, p. 567.

[3] Id.

[4] MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., ___ U.S. ___ (2005). See also, Napster and Aimster, cited elsewhere within.

Sunday, December 31, 2006

Of the case for fair use: digital distribution of course materials: creative destruction

5. Creative Destruction

There is a theory that departs from the market failure framework entirely. Raymond Shih Ray Ku suggests that “creative destruction” could supply an economic rationale for a broader interpretation of fair use.[1]

Creative destruction describes the process by which industries change from within when radical new ways of doing business undermine and eventually replace old ways. We can see this process at work in the evolution of distribution systems for copyrighted materials. Digital networks, home computers and Internet connectivity are poised to replace the physical distribution of analog media. Ku argues that law should not take sides in this process by artificially supporting the old ways of doing business through, in this case, that grant of a strong monopoly right, at the expense of the newer alternatives. Law should be neutral and let markets and evolving business models sort things out. He suggests that applying the concept of creative destruction to the analysis of the fourth fair use factor would facilitate this neutral approach (appropriately weakening the monopoly) by yielding different results from those obtained with market failure analysis.

As Ku describes it, a court can find that the fourth factor favors fair use, in other words that there has been no harm to the market for or value of a copyrighted work 1) where the copying at issue has been carried out by the person who will use the copy[2] and 2) the copying does not undermine the copyright owner’s incentive because creation of the work does not depend on the sale of copies.[3] Clearly this theory incorporates the idea that a copyright owner is not entitled to all possible sources of revenue for his creations, just those required to fund creation. It draws the line in a different place from Sony. Sony considered harm to current sources of funding and took external societal benefits into consideration as a counterbalance to harm to the copyright owner. A court relying on creative destruction can consider whether creation depends on the funding.[4] Copyright owners would not be entitled to any revenues that do not directly fund creation, even if they had received them traditionally and the proposed use eliminated or greatly reduced them.



[1] Shih Ray Ku, R., Consumers and creative destruction: Fair use beyond market failure. 18 Berkeley Technology & Law Journal 539 (2003).

[2] Indeed, the person making a copy has bought and paid for the entire distribution system himself: he buys a computer, a printer, a CD burner, and he subscribes to Internet service. The total cost of the system to make and distribute copies is no longer an expense borne by the copyright owner. Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative Destruction, pp. 544 – 545.

[3] Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and creative destruction, 565 - 566.

[4] This argument would probably suffer from similar definitional problems to those described above for market dysfunction: Which revenues are necessary to fund creation and which are not?

Tuesday, December 12, 2006

Of the case for fair use: digital distribution of course materials: market dysfunction

4. Market Dysfuntion

Although one might characterize engaging copyright owners with just such an aggressive argument [the circular reasoning -- it's all fair argument, see earlier post] as fighting fire with fire, it seems to me an extreme case to make, and as indicated above, an easy case to get around because of the ease of manipulating the four factors. After all, publishers are likely to be able to show real harm to established markets from the hypothetical Electronic Distribution uses I have described. Any court employing a market failure analysis would be hard-pressed to find the use fair: there simply is no market failure, and there are probably demonstrable lost revenues. A court that believes it is important to preserve existing revenue streams in iterative contexts can easily characterize the first three factors to favor getting permission. Voilà: End of circularity problem.

One could take a different tack, however. One could try to convince the court that even though there is a functional market for paying permission (in other words, that there is no absolute market failure), that should not be the end of the inquiry.

In fact, total market failure is not the only market failure. One can argue that market dysfunction also is market failure – and if it can be demonstrated, it should tip the fourth factor towards fair use without having to insist that lost revenues are always logically irrelevant in a nonprofit context. Although this is theoretically appealing and would appeal to the nonprofit educational and library communities, there is scant evidence that it would prove persuasive in this context. Nonetheless, it is worth our consideration.

Market dysfunction occurs when particular kinds of transactions other than those frustrated by high transaction costs do not occur as often as they should and therefore justify a finding of fair use. Normally markets give us good information about what people want, and vendors can use that information to decide where to invest their resources. But if a market is in effect misrepresenting what people want, we cannot count on it for this information. Vendors will not fill a need if they do not know it exists, or if they do not recognize the size of the potential market. Market dysfunction can happen when people forego a purchase because the price is too high. One example is where society benefits from the use an individual makes but the parties to the transaction cannot factor this benefit into their bargain. The vendor tries to charge a price that reflects the overall societal benefit, but the buyer will not, perhaps can not, pay that much. So some clearly socially beneficial transactions will not take place if an individual is expected to pay a price that reflects value he personally does not receive, value that benefits society overall.

The use of articles and book chapters by teachers in classrooms and by academic scientists in university labs illustrates just such a dysfunctional market. Educators, their students, academic researchers as well as their academic employers often cannot afford costly permission fees or database licenses, yet these uses would yield very high social benefits, far exceeding the benefit the individuals themselves derive. Conversely, the social detriment resulting from a decision not to use materials because they cost too much is significantly higher than the detriment to a particular individual who foregoes a use. If this social value weighs in favor of fair use as a counterbalance to the copyright owner’s database and license revenue losses, it is at least conceivable that a court could conclude that such uses should be termed fair even following a microeconomics theory. Thus society would receive the diffuse benefits of those educational uses regardless of the institutional inability to pay by permitting them as fair uses.

So, characterizing the educational and research markets as dysfunctional may be an appropriate and promising argument, but winning that argument will be challenging. As Wendy Gordon cautioned, courts that follow market failure reasoning will be urged to err on the side of letting markets work, to whatever extent they can, rather than to “tax copyright owners to subsidize impecunious but meritorious users in the guise of maximizing value.”[1] This description of fair use as a “tax” on copyright owners is repugnant to fair use supporters, but it is easy to understand from a market failure perspective: if your initial premise is that copyright owners are entitled to all they can conceivably get, fair use quite directly harms them by taking money out of their pockets and must be as narrowly construed as possible. In fact, our own university presses can amply demonstrate how directly economically threatened they are by the loss of these revenues, so again, it would be a hard case to make that the diffuse social benefit outweighs such demonstrable harm.

Another challenge in making a cogent market dysfunction argument is definitional: When is a university, a library or a research institution unable to pay? When is a price too high? Which institutions would qualify to exercise fair use of which materials? Who would set the “fair” prices, or would there simply be no price at which a poor school might be required to pay?

These challenges suggest that within the market failure framework, market dysfunction provides at most a theoretical relaxing of a narrow scope for fair use. Courts have not been willing to embrace this theory so far. Winning this argument would require an advocate who can envision a creative application, one that appropriately tailors the relief to need (does Harvard need this exception? does the University of Ohio? how about Florida State?), without undermining the incentive for publishers, many of whom desperately depend on permission revenues. The exception would also have to take into consideration the relative importance of the educational market to the publishers affected by its exercise. In its nuance, it sounds more appropriate for a legislative “financial hardship exception,” than a court-crafted financial hardship application of the fair use test. But, legislation that favors anyone other than copyright owners is unlikely to survive the legislative process, as we all must recognize. Failing these efforts, perhaps the argument could be successfully pressed in negotiations with publishers or their representatives regarding pricing and business models.[2]


[1] Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, p. 1632. Her point is that courts should not interfere in a working market, even if it is not working perfectly, and even if the interference is designed to subsidize a worthy cause – in this case, financially strapped educators, libraries, and researchers.

[2] As CCC is in the early stages of developing an educational blanket license, educators and libraries might urge that pricing should be based on many factors, among them what the institution has already licensed, and institutional ability to pay.

Monday, December 04, 2006

Of the case for fair use: digital distribution of course materials: the circular reasoning argument

The Strict Logic, or “Circular Reasoning” Argument

The fundamental point I am making here is that it is a mistake to think that one can win a fair use case merely on the strength of a logical, four factor analysis. That, simply put, is not how it works. The reality of how courts apply fair use renders another very old friend of nonprofit educational uses, the circularity argument, sadly ineffective. It is just too easy to get around it given the ease with which the factors can be manipulated.

Theoretically, even with a less than stellar first three factors, so long as at least two weigh in favor of fair use (in other words, the first three factors weigh at least marginally in favor of fair use), the circularity argument suggests that courts should ignore evidence of “lost” revenues, allowing only the social benefit of the use in question to tilt the fourth factor towards fair use, following the Williams & Wilkins Company v. United States case.[1]

It is wrong to measure the detriment to plaintiff by loss of presumed royalty income -- a standard which necessarily assumes that plaintiff had a right to issue licenses. That would be true, of course, only if it were first decided that the defendant's practices did not constitute “fair use.” In determining whether the company has been sufficiently hurt to cause these practices to become “unfair,” one cannot assume at the start the merit of the plaintiff's position, i.e., that plaintiff had the right to license. That conclusion results only if it is first determined that the photocopying is “unfair.”

The argument is always made in contexts like Electronic Distribution (iterative uses), but thus far, without further success.

Wendy Gordon dealt summarily with the circularity argument in her 1984 Betamax article. She called it a “formalistic question” that should not be the focus of the inquiry.[2] She began with the premise that a copyright owner is ordinarily entitled to revenue from all substantial uses of his work within the statutorily protected categories.[3] She went on to say that, “both fairness to the copyright owner and economic efficiency demand that the assessment of his injury include the loss of revenues he would receive in the market were his entitlement to be enforced.”[4] For her, the central question about whether copyright law could be adapted to new technologies was whether markets were likely to form around new uses.[5] Fair use, thus, was only for cases of present, and likely continuing, substantial market failure or market dysfunction resulting in unacceptably high social costs.[6]

The concept of market failure is part of microeconomics, the branch of economics that analyzes the market behavior of individual consumers and firms. The interaction of these individual decision-makers creates patterns of supply and demand that fix the prices of goods and factors of production and determine how resources will be allocated among competing uses.[7]

The premise underlying this kind of economic analysis facilitates sidestepping the demands of strict logic: if a copyright owner is entitled to all he can possibly get, there is little need for line drawing and no place for a “formalistic question.” If, on the other hand, he is entitled to only what is needed to provide an incentive to create, where to draw the line is central, and avoiding circular reasoning could provide a basis for drawing it. A loss of some revenues not critical to creation might be acceptable.

The fair use test in use today for iterative uses functions much as Gordon described. Because of the way the test has been simplified, the conclusion is guaranteed when it is the same as the underlying premise. “A copyright owner is entitled to any revenues that he conceivably might be able to get. If there is a functioning market for the use at issue, in other words, no market failure, the copyright owner is entitled to payment for the use. If there is a market failure, but the copyright owner can show that he can remedy it (that is, find a way to charge for the use), he is entitled to these theoretical revenues and the court cannot find that the use is fair.” This is simple, elegant and seductive. In fact, one need hardly bother with lawsuits if the law is this clear and easy to understand. Judicial economy has much to recommend it.[8]

Should universities and libraries argue something just as simple, elegant and seductive on the other side based on the circularity argument? “If a use is nonprofit and educational, even if it uses the entirety of a creative work, courts must exclude all evidence of harm to markets. Thus, all nonprofit educational uses are fair uses all the time.” These two diametrically opposed, I would say extreme, arguments nicely illustrate the “values conflict” between the commercial for-profit sector and nonprofit higher education. [9]


[1] Williams & Wilkins Company v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1357 fn19 (U.S. Ct. of Claims 1973), affirmed, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).

[2] Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, p. 1651 – 1652.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, pp. 1620 – 1621.

[7] The Politics of International Economic Relations by Joan Spero and Jeffrey Hart http://www.indiana.edu/~ipe/glossry.html.

[8] Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390 6th Cir. (Tenn.), Sep 07, 2004. The court in Bridgeport, in part, explicitly based its finding that 3 seconds sampled from a recording required licensing on the resulting judicial economy that the holding would foster. In other words, the court felt that finding fair use would encourage lawsuits; finding no fair use would discourage them.

[9] Laura N. Gasaway, Values Conflict in the Digital Environment:
Librarians Versus Copyright Holders http://www.unc.edu/~unclng/Columbia-article3.htm.

Monday, November 27, 2006

Of the case for fair use: digital distribution of course materials -- Applying Sony

Applying Sony to Electronic Distribution of Course Material

Twenty-two years have elapsed since the Court decided Sony, and time has not been kind to its fair use holding. Its presumption in favor of non-commercial uses, its shifting of the burden of proof to the plaintiffs in non-commercial cases and its rejection of the idea that fair use favored only transformational fair uses have all been subsequently abandoned.[1] Moreover, the dissent’s approach, which adopted market failure concepts, has over time become the approach of the majority opinions in iterative use cases.[2] Nevertheless, for purposes of argument, we shall explore whether faithful adherence to Sony might support a fair use claim for repeatedly posting articles within course management systems or in electronic reserves. We should also consider whether, given the availability of instant permission through the Blackboard/CCC collaboration, Sony could support even first time use as fair. Put another way, is there still a fair use argument to be made in favor of spontaneous fair use if one can easily obtain permission to use the work through the CCC?

If a court acknowledged the benefit to the public and balanced it against the harm to the copyright owners as Justice Stevens did, and limited the sources of revenue it would consider when evaluating that harm to those revenues already in existence at the time the suit was filed and the record developed for trial, could the court conclude that Electronic Distribution of educational materials is fair use?

The statute’s four factors include:

1. the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;

2. the nature of the copyrighted work;

3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.[3]

Home videotaping and noncommercial Electronic Distribution have similarities under the first factor. Both are widespread although not-for-profit. This finding in turn heavily influenced Justice Stevens’ analysis of the second and third factors. He concluded that in a nonprofit context, it was not that important that entire (third factor), creative (second factor) works were copied.[4] He emphasized that the copying at issue promoted a public good, given its obvious benefits to society.[5]

Copying for Electronic Distribution is equally, if not more, beneficial to society and enjoys the additional argument that many, although not all, of the works copied will tend to be factual. Thus, the second factor will more strongly favor fair use in many cases.

On the other hand, there are significant differences between Electronic Distribution and home videotaping. Electronic Distribution involves distribution of copies that the copyright owner offers for sale or license right now. Home videotaping involved copying by an individual for the individual’s own use broadcast programming that was offered to the public for free. These differences could affect the analysis of each of the first three factors.

So, following Sony would not necessarily result in the first three factors weighing for fair use. Sony can certainly be criticized for its reasoning on these points, and the dissent roundly does so. And, as I will suggest later, the ease with which one can manipulate the four factors is a key to understanding why we cannot rely on urging a particular view of those factors.[6] But for the moment, we will assume the best possible outcome for the first three factors in order to focus on the fourth, and to show ultimately how fallible any factor-based analysis is.

On the critical fourth factor issue of the loss of revenues, Sony placed the burden of proof on the publishers because the use at issue was nonprofit.[7] Further, the Sony assumption, that not all conceivable revenues should be considered, allowed the court to exclude revenues from any source that was not in existence at the time the case was filed and the record developed for trial. Even within this framework, copyright owners today would doubtless submit evidence to show harm to their database and permission licenses, if not to their subscriptions and sales of books and journals.

Even if some harm were shown, however, the benefit to the public from universities’ freely using articles and book chapters for Electronic Distribution would be weighed against any losses the copyright owners were able to demonstrate to their database and permission revenues. Ultimately, where the court places the burden of proving harm to revenues could affect the outcome, but even if the burden were on the plaintiffs, they might prevail on the fourth factor. That is, they might be able to show that the harm Electronic Distribution causes to their database and permissions revenues, if not their subscriptions and sales revenues, outweighs the public benefit of allowing the uses. Nevertheless, a result along these lines could still be favorable: possibly three to one in favor of fair use for Electronic Distribution. But with this result in hand, we now can see how fair use’s flexibility proves to be its liability.

We fool ourselves if we indulge the belief that Sony provides us a fair use pass for Electronic Distribution, for the truth is that all four factors are so easily manipulated that they can be made to conform to any desired outcome without difficulty.[8] For example, if the court believes that it is socially desirable to make nonprofit educational uses free of permissions and royalties, it will logically conclude that the social benefit outweighs harm to markets and minimize the effect of the use under factors one, two and three. On the other hand, if the court believes that uses that can be paid for through an existing market should be paid for, it will find that the harm to markets outweighs the social benefit of allowing uncompensated uses. The first three factors can be made to come out however they need to come out to support the conclusion the court has otherwise reached. Thus, even though by the numbers, following Sony, one can make the fair use case for Electronic Distribution (three out of four should logically result in a finding of fair use), if a court wants to protect revenues in established markets, to say nothing of desiring to protect possible revenues that might form around markets in the future, it can easily emphasize the facts that would support a determination that at least one and possibly two of the first three factors favor getting permission. The plaintiffs will have supplied the court with a plethora of such facts. The amount and nature of the work used, factors two and three, are quite flexible. Even the first factor can be made to reflect negatively on a proposed use. Words like “systematic,” “repeated,” “multiple,” or “blatant” can be applied even to nonprofit educational activity to sully the character of the use under the first factor. A use that loses support along the way to the fourth factor is doomed if the copyright owner can demonstrate harm to revenues.


[1] Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music.

[2] Texaco; MDS; Kinko’s; Kelly; Field.

[3] 17 U.S.C. 107.

[4] Sony, pp. 448 – 450.

[5] Sony, pp. 443 – 447.

[6] David Nimmer, Fairest of Them All and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 263 (Winter/Spring 2003).

[7] Sony, p. 451.

[8] David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All.”

Monday, November 20, 2006

Of the case for fair use: digital distribution of course materials -- The Sony Case

The Sony Case

Most of the time. Sony was an important exception.[1] In 1976, several major motion picture studios sued Sony, the maker of the Betamax video tape recorder (VTR), alleging that Sony was vicariously responsible for the way television audiences used the VTR (much as we use the videocassette recorder today). The movie studios alleged that audiences’ recording infringed the copyrights in their programs and that Sony was responsible for the infringement because it manufactured and sold the machine that made the copying possible. The majority found that Sony could be vicariously liable for television viewers’ copying only if the Betamax had no substantial non-infringing uses. It examined the way people used the VTR and found that recording a program to watch it at a later time (timeshifting) was a substantial non-infringing use because it was a fair use.

Justice Stevens delivered the majority’s opinion. He did not follow a narrow market failure rationale. In fact, a narrow market failure rationale would almost certainly have led to the opposite result, as Justice Blackmun argued in dissent. After all, if the Court had ruled that the use of the Betamax were not fair, the makers of VTRs could have gotten together with the easily located copyright owners and agreed to pay them a royalty for the privilege of manufacturing and selling a device that enabled massive copying of protected works. A ruling that such copying was an infringement and not excused by fair use would probably have brought about that result in short order (thus “curing” the market failure). But Sony found that massive copying of broadcast programming for convenience was a fair use. Glynn Lunney describes the Court’s fair use calculus:

In defining the balance between these competing public interests, Sony begins with a presumption in favor of fair use and a broad conception of the public interest that fair use protects. Merely increasing access to a work, even unauthorized access, represents a sufficient public interest to invoke the fair use doctrine. A transformative or “productive” use is not required. Once the fair use doctrine is invoked, Sony places the burden squarely on the copyright owner to justify recognition of her private ownership rights. Only where the copyright owner has demonstrated by the preponderance of the evidence that the net benefit to society will be greater if a use is prohibited, should a court conclude that a use is unfair.[2]

In evaluating the critical fourth factor, the effect of the use on the value of or market for the work, the majority seemed to assume that the copyright owners needed a certain amount of income to ensure creation of their works, but that additional sources of income not currently in existence need not be created and funneled to them in order to achieve copyright’s goals. In other words, not all the income that might conceivably flow to the copyright owners had to flow to them.[3] This is a classic statement of the limited monopoly rationale of copyright law. Courts following market failure reasoning based on high transaction costs never make this kind of assumption.[4]



[1] Sony v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). More recent cases also support fair use of iterative copies, in Internet contexts where there would be devastating market failure if a license were required. See, for example, Kelly v. Ariba Soft, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) and Field v. Google, 412 F.Supp.2d 1106 (D.Nev. 2006). Both involve iterative copying intrinsically a part of the operation of Internet search engines where requiring permission for each copy made before making it, or indeed imposing any requirement for a license would undermine the viability of search technology on the Internet. Further, the courts in both cases characterized the iterative coping as transformative, and concluded that it did not affect the copyright owner’s market for the original. Indeed, there was no market for the original in the Field case. These cases thus support the basic assertion of this paper insofar as they indicate the overriding importance of characterizing a use as transformative, and of market harm and market failure, to the results of the fair use analysis in iterative cases.

[2] Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B. U. L. Rev. 975 (2002).

[3] Sony, pp. 450 - 451.

[4] See, for example the Texaco, Kinko’s, and MDS decisions, and the Sony dissent. The Sony majority simply did not cast the case in market failure terms. Had it done so, the use could not have been fair under the description set forth earlier in this paper. On the other hand, the use might have been fair if the Court considered the market failure existing at the time as a permanent or uncurable failure.